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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following his entry of a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver, Mr. Moran-Soto timely appeals from the judgment.
Mr. Moran-Soto asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress a bindle of suspected controlled substance seized during a warrantless search
of his person. Mr. Moran-Soto asserts that his consent to the search of his pocket was
involuntarily given. In addition, because the officers did not have probable cause to
arrest him until after the search of his pocket, the district court erred in relying upon the
doctrine of inevitable discovery.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
Wearing police uniforms, badges, and guns, Sergeant Hoadley and Officer
Hemmert entered the El Sureno bar. (Tr. 11/13/08, p.57, L.25
.

.

.

- p.58, L.16.) '

Sergeant

Hoadley
saw two men sitting at the bar, as well as a bartender behind the bar.
.

..~

. . . ,.~.

(Tr.11/6/08, p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.9) The officer saw one of the patrons, Mr. Castro, look
at the officers and then immediately push a napkin away from himself onto the
bartender's lower side of the bar. (Tr.11/6/08, p.14, Ls.22-25, p.33, Ls.12-16, p.34,
Ls.7-12.) Not having found the people they were looking for, Officer Hemmert decided
to do a "bar check." He walked behind the bar to examine the license, then walked the

'

The record on appeal contains numerous transcripts, including two hearings on the
Motion to Suppress. For ease of reference, the transcripts of the hearings on the
Motion to Suppress will be cited by the date of the hearing held, and the Preliminary
Hearing transcript, of which the district court took judicial notice during one of the
hearings on the Motion to Suppress will be cited as "PH Tr."

. .

length of the bar. As he did so, he saw the crumpled napkin with plastic hanging out.
(Tr.11/06/08, p.9, Ls.3-10.) Believing that the napkin may contain drugs, he opened the
napkin and found two plastic baggies with a crystal substance inside. (Tr.11/06/08, p.9,
L.17

- p.10,

L.I.)

Everyone in the bar was told "to stay where they were at ...."

(Tr.l1/06/08, p.16, Ls.13-16.)
Because the napkin was found on the bartender's side of the bar near some
sunglasses and a soda can, Officer Hemmert decided to detain the bartender.
However, the bartender didn't want to be detained so he "physically resisted" and was
ultimately handcuffed. (Tr.11/06/08, p.13, L.10

- p.14,

L.21; PH Tr., p.15, Ls.16-21.)

Officer Hemmert also handcuffed Mr. Castro. (Tr.11/06/08, p.17, Ls.2-3.) These two
men were separated from each other so that the officers could "talk to them to get their
stories." (Tr.11/06/08, p.41, Ls.6-8.)
While being questioned, Mr. Castro, the man that had pushed the napkin away
from himself upon seeing the officers enter the bar, told the officers that Mr. Moran. ......

~.~~,,

Soto, the
other
bar patron who. had
been sitting next to Mr. Castro, "was attempting to
..
. . . . . .. .... . . . .
..
,

,

,

sell methamphetamine at the bar."

.

..

. .

,

,...

.

.. . . . . .

.

,

.

,.

. .

,.. , .

(Tr.11/06/08, p.42, Ls.24-25, p.57, Ls.2-17;

Tr.l1/13/09, p.123, Ls.1-5.)
Sergeant Hoadley took responsibility for "dealing with" Mr. Moran-Soto.
(Tr.l1/06/08, p.17, Ls.4-6; p.40, Ls.17-18.) Sergeant Hoadley asked Mr. Moran-Soto
for identification, and Mr. Moran-Soto provided "some sort of Mexico identification card."
(Tr.11106/08, p.46, Ls.10-15.) After looking over the card and running Mr. Moran-Soto's
name through dispatch, the sergeant "set the card back down on the bar." (Tr.11/06/08,
p.47, Ls.1-3.) At this time, Mr. Moran-Soto did not know that he had the right to remain

2

silent or that he had "the right not to have them search [his] pockets." (Tr.11/6/08, p.82,

Sergeant Hoadley asked Mr. Moran-Soto, in English, if he had anything illegal on
him. According to the district court's factual findings, Mr. Moran-Soto responded in
English, told the officer that he did not, and then told the officer to "check." (Tr.l1/06/08,
p.47, L.7 - p.48, L.8; Tr.11/13/08, p.121, Ls.1-4.) Sergeant Hoadley asked Mr. MoranSoto to empty his pockets, and Mr. Moran-Soto complied. The officer then asked again
if "he had anything else, and the defendant raised his arm and said, check...."
(Tr.I1M3/08, p.121, Ls.8-11.) The officer reached into Mr. Moran-Soto's pocket and
found a plastic bindle, which the officer believed contained controlled substances.
(Tr.11/13/09, p.121, Ls.10-15.)

Upon finding the bindle in Mr. Moran-Soto's pocket,

Sergeant Hoadley "considered that he may have a role in this drug deal." (Tr.11/6/09,
p.56, Ls.2-9.) Mr. Moran-Soto was "detained in handcuffs and advised of his rights."

Sergeant Hoadley read Mr. Moran-Soto his ~ i r a n d arights
~
in English, and
Mr. Moran-Soto told the officer "he didn't understand what I was saying." (Tr.11/6/08,
p.51, L.16 - p.52, L.6.) Thereafter the officer asked the owner of the bar to translate the
rights and read the rights one line at a time. (Tr.11/6/08, p.53, L.19

- p.54,

L.19.)

Although the officer believed the bar owner was translating what he was saying, the
officer did not know the Spanish words used in the Miranda warning. (Tr.11/6/08, p.54,
Ls.4-19.) When subsequently questioned Mr. Moran-Soto told Sergeant Hoadley that
the plastic bindle from his pocket was his. (PH Tr., p.26, L.22
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

- p.27, L.1.)

Mr. Moran-Soto was charged with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver. (R., pp.20-21.) His counsel filed a motion to suppress the controlled
substances found in Mr. Moran-Soto's pocket "as a result of the warrantless seizure and
search of his person."

(R., pp.24-25.)

In addition, Mr. Moran-Soto filed an affidavit

which asserted that he did not speak or understand the English language, but "The
officer indicated to me, by making motions, that I had to empty out my pockets."
(R., p.26.)

In an Amended Motion to Suppress and Notice of Hearing, counsel for

Mr. Moran-Soto further requested "an Order suppressing the admissions/confessions
made to law enforcement as being un-warned and coerced." (R., p.32.)
Following two hearings on the suppression motions, the district court determined
that, "It's clear from the testimony that the defendant did not - was not totally adept at
English, that he spoke some English, and that the conversation

- regardless of

the

officer's limited Spanish, they didn't speak in Spanish." (Tr.11/13/08, p.121, Ls.16-22.)
As regards the search of Mr. Moran-Soto, the district court found:
.. . ,... .. ."...........,...
~

....... ..

~

We have a simplified conversation about emptying your pockets, do you
ha"& gnything @ISe;chGdk clS
and^
i.eve.t
mwnicationlevel
taken in the totality of the circumstances was sufficient at that stage, that
the defendant understood the questions, and that the search was
voluntary, using the term "check." He also testified here that he'd been
working in this country for several years, although they speak Spanish on
his job.

(Tr.11/13/08, p.123, L.25 - p.124, L.9.) The district court concluded:
As to the search of the defendant's pocket to which the items were found,
I'm denying that motion.... I believe the officers have laid sufficient
foundation for me to believe, based on the preponderance of the
evidence, that there was sufficient communication and understanding
between Officer Hoadley and the defendant.
He was requesting that he empty his pockets, which he did to the
bar. Despite the fact that the officers were in uniform, had cuffed other
people, and that there was a -- I can't deny there was a certain aspect

-

about this that just as a course of nature -the defendant wasn't cuffed at
that point.
And he - he was being interviewed by the officer, and he asked if
he had anything else, and he told him to check. I don't find that this was
coerced to the point that it was an involuntary consent by the defendant to
have the officer check his pockets, any more than it would be when the
person is under arrest at his house and he consents to the officer to
enter...It's a case that's open for argument, but I believe the state's met its
burden.
(Tr.l1/13/08, p.124, L.24

- p.126,

L.7.) The district court further found that, even if

Mr. Moran-Soto had not consented to the search, the packet in his pocket would have
been inevitably discovered by police.
Certainly when the [sic] Officer Hemmert went behind the bar, the
reasonable conclusions were when he discovered they were drugs that it
was either the bartender or Mr. Castro had the drugs. And I think that
was a fair agreement, and that they didn't conclude the defendant had the
drugs.
It's then accompanied by statements by those individuals that the
defendant was trying to sell drugs. That is sufficient enough probable
cause for an officer to make a determination to arrest. And if - and if that
arrest would have been made, there would have been a search incident to
arrest, and that drug in the pocket would have been discovered anyway.
(Tr.11113/08, p.126, L.18-p.127, L.B.)
.. ... . ... ..~
..... . ~~.

As'regards the suppression of any statements made by Mr. Moran-Soto, the

district court stated, "I don't find that the state's proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that [the Miranda rights] were communicated in a fashion that could be clearly
understood by the defendant." (Tr.11113/08, p.123, Ls.9-14.) The court explained the
differing decisions on Mr. Moron-Soto's understanding of what was said by noting, "the
Miranda warnings are a complicated level of items that have significant impact, and we
don't know that [the bar owner] interpreted those correctly. And so I can't find that the
defendant was presented his rights." (Tr.ll-13-08, p.124, Ls.10-14.) Thus, the district

.

.

court suppressed Mr. Moran-Soto's statement regarding his ownership of the bindle.
(Tr.11/13/08, p.124, Ls.18-23.)
Mr. Moran-Soto eventually entered a conditional guilty plea resewing his right to
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.39, 48-49.) The
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Moran-Soto on probation.

(R., pp.53-54.)

Mr. Moran-Soto filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment and Commitment and
Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment. (R., pp.53, 63.)

ISSUE
In light of the State's failure to meet its burden of showing that Mr. Moran-Soto
voluntarily consented to the search of his person or that the item removed from
Mr. Moran-Soto's pocket would have been inevitably discovered by officers, did the
district court err when it denied Mr. Moran-Soto's motion to suppress the item removed
from his pocket?

ARGUMENT
In Light Of The State's Failure To Meet Its Burden Of Showing That Mr. Moran-Soto
Voluntarilv Consented To The Search Of His Person Or That The ltem Removed From
Mr. Moran-Soto's Pocket Would Have Been Inevitably Discovered Bv Officers, The
District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Moran-Soto's Motion To Suppress The Item
Removed From His Pocket
A.

Introduction
Mr. Moran-Soto asserts that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he

voluntarily consented to Sergeant Hoadley's search of his person. In addition, he
asserts that State failed to meet its burden of proving that the officers had probable
cause to arrest him. Thus, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
the item found in his pocket.
B.

Because The State Failed To Meet Its Burden Of Showing That Mr. Moran-Soto
Voluntarilv Consented To The Search Of His Person, The District Court Erred
When It Denied Mr. Moran-Soto's Motion To Suppress The ltem Taken From His
Pocket
The district court denied Mr. Moran-Soto's motion to suppress the item removed

regards the search of Mr. Moran-Soto, the district court found that Mr. Moran-Soto
"understood the questions, and that the search was voluntary, using the term "check."
(Tr.11113/08, p.123, L.25 - p.124, L.9.) Although the court recognized that the officers
were in uniform and had handcuffed people, the court didn't find that the consent was
"coerced to the point that it was an involuntary consent...." (Tr.11/13/08, p.124, L.24

-

p.126, L.7.) Mr. Moran-Soto asserts that, based upon the totality of the circumstances,
the district court erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to the search of his
person.

In reviewing a district court order denying a motion to suppress evidence, the
standard of review is bifurcated. State v. Purdum, 147 ldaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182,
183 (2009) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. However, the appellate court may freely
review the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.

Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects "[tjhe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; ldaho Const. Art. I, $ 17.

"Warrantless searches are

presumptively unreasonable and the State bears the burden to demonstrate that a
warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." State v. Martinez,
129 ldaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). The United
States Supreme Court has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d
1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
Sergeant Hoadley searched Mr. Moran-Soto without having first obtained a
search warrant. (PH Tr., p.31, Ls.3-5.) As a result, the search of Mr. Moran-Soto is
presumptively unreasonable.

However, a search conducted with consent that was

freely given is one exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). The State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the consent to search was voluntary as opposed to being the result of duress or
coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221. A voluntary decision is "the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker," while an
individual's consent is involuntary "if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. To determine
whether a subject's will was overborne in a particular case, the court must assess "the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and
the details of the interrogation." Id. at 226. Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or
was the product of coercion, is a factual determination to be based upon the
surrounding circumstances, accounting for subtly coercive police questions and the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the party from whom consent is elicited. Id. at

A determination of voluntariness is not dependent "on the presence or the
absence of a single controlling criterion." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93
S.Ct. at 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862. Factors to be considered include
whether there were numerous officers involved in the confrontation,
Castellon v. United States, 864 A.2d 141, 155 (D.C.2004); United
Sfates v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358, 361 (6th Cir.1988); the location and
conditions of the consent, including whether it was at night, United
Statesv. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 77-78 (2d Cir.1973); whether the police
retained the individual's identification, United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d
1346, 1353 (11th Cir.1984); whether the individual was free to leave,
Ohio v. Robinetfe, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d
347, 354-55 (1996); Chemaly, 741 F.2d at 1353; Sfate v. Gutierrez, 137
ldaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct.App.2002); and whether the
individual knew of his right to refuse consent, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
248-49, 93 S.Ct at 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; Chemaly, 741 F.2d at
1353; State v. Jones, 126 ldaho 791, 793, 890 P.2d 1214, 1216
(Ct.App.1995). Although the presence of multiple officers does not,
standing alone, establish coercion, and there is no requirement that police
inform the individual he is free to leave or that he has a right to refuse
consent, these factors are nevertheless relevant when assessing the
totality of the circumstances. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40, 117 S.Ct.
at 421, 136 L.Ed.2d at 354-55; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. at

2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; Jones, 846 F.2d at 361; Chemaly, 741 F.2d at
1353; Castellon, 864 A.2d at 155; Gutierrez, 137 ldaho at 651, 51 P.3d at
465; Jones, 126 Idaho at 793,890 P.2d at 1216.
Sfafe v. Garcia, 143 ldaho 774,778, 152 P.3d 645,649 (Ct. App. 2006).
In the case at bar, the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Mr. Moran-Soto made a free and unconstrained choice to allow Sergeant Hoadley
to search him. Mr. Moran-Soto was confronted with two uniformed officers wearing both
badges and guns.

(Tr.11113108, p.57, L.25

-

p.58, L.16.)

Prior to the search of

Mr. Moran-Soto, Officer Hemmert had ordered everyone "to stay where they were at.. .."
(Tr.11106108, p.16, Ls.13-16.) Even Sergeant Hoadley agreed that Mr. Moran-Soto was
detained at the time of the search.

(Tr.1116108, p.44, Ls.17-21.)

Having taken

Mr. Moran-Soto's identification, looking over the card and running Mr. Moran-Soto's
name through dispatch, the sergeant didn't return the card, but rather simply "set the
card back down on the bar." (Tr.11106108, p.47, Ls.1-3.) Finally, even if Mr. MoranSoto, whose English understanding is extremelylimited at best, didn't understand the
order to remain where he was, he had witnessed the result of resisting the officers'
commands. When the bartender failed to comply with the orders of the officers, a
physical altercation ensued and he was placed in handcuffs. (Tr.11106108, p.13, L.10 p.14, L.21; PH Tr., p.15, Ls.16-21.) Although Mr. Moran-Soto had seen this, the officers
didn't tell him that he was free to leave. (Tr.1116/08, p.60, Ls.20-22.)
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the State failed to meet its burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Moran-Soto's consent to the
search was a free and unconstrained choice. Rather, the evidence shows that it was

coerced. Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Moran-Soto's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his person.
C.

Because The Officers Did Not Have Probable Cause To Arrest Mr. Moran-Soto
Prior To The Search Of His Pockets, The District Court Erred When It Found
That The Officers Would Have lnevitablv Discovered The Bindle In Mr. MoranSoto's Pocket
The district court found that, even if Mr. Moran-Soto had not consented to the

search of his person, the bindle in his pocket would have been inevitably discovered by
police.
Certainly when the [sic] Officer Hemmert went behind the bar, the
reasonable conclusions were when he discovered they were drugs that it
was either the bartender or Mr. Castro had the drugs. And I think that
was a fair agreement, and that they didn't conclude the defendant had the
drugs.
It's then accompanied by statements by those individuals that the
defendant was trying to sell drugs. That is sufficient enough probable
cause for an officer to make a determination to arrest. And if - and if that
arrest would have been made, there would have been a search incident to
arrest, and that drug in the pocket would have been discovered anyway.
(Tr.11/13/08, p.126, L.18 - p.127, L.6.) Mr. Moran-Soto asserts that, prior to the search
.

~

the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him, and-didnoteffectuate an arrest.
Thus, the district court erred in finding that the item taken from his pocket would have
been inevitably discovered even absent the involuntary search.
I.

Because The State Failed To Prove By A Preponderance Of The
Evidence That Prior To Searching Mr. Moran-Soto An Arrest Actually Took
Place, Or Was In The Process Of Taking Place. The District Court Erred
In Concludina That The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Applied In This
Case

-

In determining that officers would have inevitably discovered the bindle in
Mr. Moran-Soto's pocket, the district court found that there was sufficient probable

..

cause for arrest and "and if that arrest would have been made, there would have been a
search incident to arrest, and that drug in the pocket would have been discovered
anyway." (Tr.11113108, p.126, L.18

- p.127, L.6.)

However, because the inevitable

discovery doctrine is not based upon what an officer could or should do, but rather upon
what is actually happening, the district court erred.
The ldaho Court of Appeals has recognized that the inevitable discovery doctrine
is not based upon a determination of the various options law enforcement officers had,
but rather is based upon what the officers were actually doing.
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that a
preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took
place, or was in the process of taking place, would have led to the
discovery of the evidence that was already obtained through unlawful
police action. See Nix, 467 U.S. 431,448-49, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2511-12, 81
L.Ed.2d 377, 390-91 (where an already underway search operation would
have inevitably discovered a murder victim's body). The inevitable
discovery doctrine was not intended to allow a court to consider what
actions the authorities should or could have taken and in doing so then
determine that lawful discovery of already unlawfully obtained evidence
would have been inevitable. See Unifed Sfafes v. Reilly, 224 F.3d 986,
995 (9th Cir.2000); State v. Holman, 109 ldaho 382, 392, 707 P.2d 493,
503 (1985).
State v. Bunfing, 142 ldaho 908, 916-17, 136 P.3d 379, 387-88 (Ct. App. 2006).
In the present case, the officers were not in the process of effectuating an arrest
of Mr. Moran-Soto. There is also no evidence that officers were contemplating an arrest
of Mr. Moran-Soto at the time he was searched.

(See generally, Trs. 11/6/08,

11113108.) Rather, unlike the other two suspects, prior to searching Mr. Moran-Soto
officers had not handcuffed him. (Tr.11/6/08, p.43, Ls.4-22.)
Because the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that prior
to searching Mr. Moran-Soto an arrest actually took place, or was in the process of

taking place, the district court erred in concluding that the inevitable discovery doctrine
applied in this case.
2.

Even Assuminq, Aruuendo, That The Doctrine Of Inevitable Discovery
Applies To This Case. Because The Officers Did Not Have Probable
Cause To Arrest Mr. Moran-Soto Prior To The Search. The State Failed
To Prove That The Bindle Would Have Been Inevitably Discovered
a.

The District Court's Factual Findina That There Was A Statement
By The Bartender That Mr. Moran-Soto Was Attempting To Sell
Drugs Is Clearly Erroneous

In determining whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Moran-Soto,
the district court found that the officers' knowledge of the existence of the drugs behind
the bar was "accompanied by statements by those individuals that the defendant was
trying to sell drugs." (Tr.11/13/08, p.126, L.18

- p.127, L.1.)

Counsel for the State did

assert during argument that an officer had testified that both Mr. Castro and the
bartender had alleged that Mr. Moran-Soto had attempted to sell drugs. (Tr.11/13/08,
p.108, L.19

- p.109,

L.4.) Based upon the State's argument, and from the district

court's use of plural terms, it appears that the district court found that more than one
person told the officers that Mr. Moran-Soto had attempted to sell drugs. Mr. MoranSoto asserts that the district court's finding that more than one person made such a
statement is clearly erroneous.
On appeal, this Court reviews the findings of fact of the district court for whether
those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Medina v. State, 132 Idaho 722, 725,
979 P.2d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 1999). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported
by substantial and competent evidence. Id. "Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
See, e.g., Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64,67, 57 P.3d 775, 778 (2002).
Sergeant Hoadley testified that the allegation that Mr. Moran-Soto had attempted
to sell a controlled substance was made by Mr. Castro. (Tr.l1/6/08, p.34, Ls.7-12, p.42,
Ls.16-25, p.57, Ls.2-17.) There was no testimony presented that indicated that anyone
other than Mr. Castro alleged that Mr. Moran-Soto attempted to sell a controlled
substance. (See generally, Trs. 11/6/08, 11/13/08.)
Because the evidence established only that Mr. Castro alleged that Mr. MoranSoto had attempted to sell a controlled substance, the district court's finding that more
than one person made this allegation is clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court erred
in relying upon it's erroneous finding to determine that the officer's had probable cause
to arrest Mr. Moran-Soto and this Court should not rely upon that finding in reviewing
this case.
b.

The Officers Did Not Have Probable Cause To Arrest Mr. MoranSoto Prior To The Search

Because the only evidence that the officers possessed indicating that Mr. MoranSoto had committed a crime was the self-serving statement of Mr. Castro, the oficers
did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Moran-Soto prior to the search.
Whether an arrest is constitutionally valid "depends upon whether, at the moment
the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it-whether at that
moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also I.C. § 19-603 (providing that a police officer may arrest a
person without a warrant, "when a felony has in fact been committed and he has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it."); State v.
Alger, 100 ldaho 675, 677, 603 P.2d 1009, 1011 ( I 979) (defining probable cause in the
context of I.C.

5 19-603 as "information that 'would

lead a man of ordinary care and

prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion"' that the subject of
arrest is guilty).
In determining whether officers had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient
to warrant a prudent man in believing that he had committed or was committing an
offense, the reliability of the informant and the basis of the informant's knowledge must
be considered. Cf Dunlap v. State, 126 ldaho 901, 894 P.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1995)
(addressing probable cause for issuance of a search warrant); see also Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 95, n.6 (1964) (applying standards for determining probable cause for a
search warrant to the question of whether there was probable cause for an arrest).
Where the information has come from a "citizen informant," disclosure of the
person's name and address will ordinarily be sufficient to show the informant's veracity
and reliability. State v. Peterson, 133 ldaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App.
1999). However, where the informant is part of the criminal milieu, officers must have
more than simply the name and address of the informant. Dunlap, 126 ldaho at 907,
894 P.2d at 140.

The additional evidence of reliability may be provided by the

informant's acknowledgment that he or she has participated in criminal activity.
Peterson, 133 ldaho at 47, 981 P.2d at 1157. This is because if the informant's identity
is known, the "risk and opprobrium" from acknowledgment of criminal conduct is

correspondingly greater, and thus the hearsay assertions of a known informant may be
given more credibility. Id. However, "Once a person believes that the police have
sufficient evidence to convict him, his statement that another person is more important
to his criminal enterprise than he gains little credibility from its inculpatory aspect."

U.S. v. Hall, 113 F.3d 157, 159 (gthCir. 1997).
In the present case, prior to the search of Mr.

s or an-soto, the officers did not

have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that he had committed or was committing an offense.

The only evidence that the

officers possessed was Mr. Castro's statement that Mr. Moran-Soto had a.ttempted to
sell him a controlled substance.
Tr.11/13/09, p.123, Ls.1-5.)

(Tr.'l1/06/08,

p.42, Ls.24-25, p.57, Ls.2-17;

At that time, Mr. Castro was handcuffed and being

interrogated by Officer Hemmert. (Tr.11/6/08, p.14, Ls.22-25, p. 42, Ls.16-25, p.43,
Ls.8-16.) Mr. Castro was also the only person Sergeant Hoadley had actually seen
touch the napkin and bindles that Officer Hemmert had found on the bar. (Tr.11/06/08,
p.33, L.12 - p.34, L.17.) As a result, Mr. Castro had every incentive to point the finger
at someone else. Mr. Castro's statement cannot even be said to be reliable based upon
its inculpatory nature as he was merely passing the blame for the drugs already found
on to Mr. Moran-Soto. Thus, the statement lacked any evidence of credibility at all.
Because the only evidence possessed by the officers prior to the search of
Mr. Moran-Soto lacked credibility, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him.

See Beck, 379 U.S. at 91; see also I.C. § 19-603. The district court, therefore, erred
when it denied Mr. Moran-Soto's motion to suppress the evidence found during the
search of his person based upon the inevitable discovery doctrine.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above argument and authority, Mr. Moran-Soto respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of judgment and commitment

=

and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
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